The public goods game is widely accepted as a suitable theoretical paradigm for explaining collective cooperation. In this paper, we investigate the impact of heterogeneous investments on cooperation in groups, where the investment of one player to a particular group depends on the fraction of cooperators in that group. Our research reveals that the level of cooperation is significantly promoted as the level of heterogeneity in the investments increases.

By studying the payoffs of players at the boundaries of cooperative clusters, we show that the positive effect on the evolution of cooperation can be attributed to the formation of clusters that are more robust against invading defectors. The presented results sharpen our understanding of cooperation in groups that are due to heterogeneity and related asymmetric influences on game dynamics.

Q. Wang, H. Wang, Z. Zhang, Y. Li, Y. Liu, M.Perc, Heterogeneous investments promote cooperation in evolutionary public goods games, Physica A 502 (2018) 570–575